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O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal arises out of a civil tax fraud proceeding in 
United States Tax Court.  The taxpayer challenges the Tax 
Court’s determination that, under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, his previous guilty plea for criminal tax evasion 
conclusively established the taxability to him of specific 
income that his criminal indictment charged him with failing 
to report.  He additionally argues on the basis of a number of 
preclusion doctrines that the Internal Revenue’s (IRS) 
concession of all tax deficiency and penalty issues for certain 
years should have prevented it from obtaining recovery of 
such payments in other years because the issues for all years 
were identical.  As explained below, we find that these 
arguments are without merit, and we will therefore affirm the 
Tax Court’s judgment. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 On September 30, 2005, Petitioner Walter Anderson 
was charged in a superseding indictment with federal tax 
evasion for tax years 1995 through 1999, in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7201.  During those years, Anderson was a 
telecommunications entrepreneur and venture capitalist who 
was actively involved in the operation of several international 
companies.  Among these companies was Gold & Appel 
Transfer S.A. (G & A), a British Virgin Islands corporation 
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which generated hundreds of millions of dollars of income 
during the tax years at issue.  The government alleged that 
because G & A was a “controlled foreign corporation,” under 
Anderson’s control, he was required to recognize a share of 
its income on his tax return and that he fraudulently failed to 
do so.  The government alleged that for the five-year period at 
issue, Anderson had fraudulently underpaid his taxes by $184 
million, 99% of which stemmed from the income of G & A.    
Pursuant to an agreement with the government, on September 
8, 2006, Anderson pleaded guilty to the federal tax evasion 
charges for 1998 and 1999, while those same charges for 
1995, 1996 and 1997 were dismissed.
1
  He was sentenced to 
108 months imprisonment.   
 On July 17, 2007, the IRS issued a notice to Anderson 
determining civil tax deficiencies and fraud penalties for tax 
years 1995 through 1999.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212, 6663.  
(The deficiency amounted to the $184 million of underpaid 
                                              
 
1
 Anderson had also been charged with obstruction of 
the internal revenue laws of the United States, in violation of 
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), fraud in the first degree under the laws 
of the District of Columbia, specifically 22 D.C. Code § 
3221(a), in relation to D.C. income tax filings and payments 
for years 1995 through 1999, and evasion of D.C. use taxes 
on a number of purchases made between 1997 and 2001, also 
in violation of 22 D.C. Code § 3221(a).  All of these charges 
were dismissed with the exception of the charge of first 
degree fraud under D.C. law for 1999, to which Anderson 
pleaded guilty. 
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taxes, resulting in a fraud penalty of $138 million.
2
)  On 
September 7, 2007, while he was incarcerated in New Jersey, 
Anderson filed a petition in the United States Tax Court to 
redetermine these deficiencies.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a).  In 
response to motions by both parties, the Tax Court granted 
partial summary judgment to the IRS, finding that under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, Anderson’s criminal 
conviction for tax evasion in 1998 and 1999 precluded him 
from contesting that he fraudulently underpaid his incomes 
taxes in those two years.  The Tax Court denied summary 
judgment on the fraud issue for tax years 1995-1997, without 
prejudice to renew the motion “with a better record and more 
focused contentions.”    
 The holding on the 1998 and 1999 tax years had three 
principal effects.  First, it established that Anderson had 
underpaid his income taxes in 1998 and 1999.  Second, 
because a fraud penalty can only be assessed where a tax 
underpayment is due to fraud, it relieved the IRS of its burden 
of proving this penalty was applicable to Anderson for those 
two years.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6663(a).  Finally, because the 
three-year statute of limitations on the assessment of a tax 
does not apply where a tax return has been filed falsely or 
fraudulently with the intent of evading tax, 26 U.S.C. § 
6501(c)(1), it prevented Anderson from arguing that the IRS’s 
attempts to collect taxes for 1998 and 1999 were untimely.
3
  
                                              
 
2
 The penalty is equal to 75% of the amount of the 
underpayment of tax that is due to fraud.  See 26 U.S.C. § 
6663(a). 
 
 
3
 Anderson filed his tax return for 1998 on September 
30, 1999, and his tax return for 1999 on October 19, 2000.  
Without this exception to the three-year statute of limitations, 
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Though this decision established that Anderson had 
fraudulently underpaid his income taxes in 1998 and 1999, it 
left open for further proceedings the determination of the 
amounts of the tax deficiencies and penalties for those years. 
 
 Based on this ruling, the IRS filed a motion to sever 
tax years 1995, 1996, and 1997 from the case, stating that it 
“ha[d] decided to concede all tax and penalty issues for [those 
years] and wishe[d] to file a motion for entry of decision as to 
those years.”  In its motion, the IRS explained that nearly 
80% of the total deficiency and penalties for the five-year 
period stemmed from just 1998 and 1999, and that because 
proving fraud for 1995 through 1997 via trial would 
needlessly complicate and lengthen the case for a 
comparatively limited additional monetary recovery, it 
preferred to abandon its efforts for those years.  The Tax 
Court found that, given its particular procedural rules, 
severing the case in this way would needlessly create clerical 
and administrative complexities, and it therefore denied the 
motion.  It stated in its order, however, that it would “take 
notice of the [IRS’s] concession of all tax and penalty issues 
for 1995, 1996, and 1997 and [would] reflect that concession 
in its eventual entry of decision in [the] case.”   
 
 This order led to the filing of a second set of summary 
judgment motions.  Anderson argued in his motion that, 
notwithstanding the Tax Court’s earlier holding that his 
criminal convictions for tax evasion collaterally estopped him 
from denying fraudulent underpayment of tax in 1998 and 
1999, the IRS’s subsequent concession of all tax and penalty 
                                                                                                     
the IRS’s notice of tax deficiency issued on July 17, 2007, 
would have been untimely. 
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issues for 1995, 1996, and 1997 established that the income 
of G & A and interest income from an account at Barclays 
Bank were not taxable to him even in 1998 and 1999.  The 
IRS, meanwhile, argued in its motion that Anderson was 
precluded from contesting that the income of G & A in 1998 
and 1999 constituted taxable income to him under Subpart F 
of the Tax Code.  The Tax Court denied Anderson’s motion 
and granted partial summary judgment to the IRS.  It held, in 
favor of the IRS, that the  concessions related to tax years 
1995 through 1997 did not resolve the deficiency and penalty 
issues for 1998 and 1999.  It further agreed with the IRS’s 
position that the proceedings in Anderson’s criminal case 
established that G & A’s income in 1998 and 1999 was 
taxable to him.  The Tax Court rejected the IRS’s argument, 
however, that Anderson’s guilty plea estopped him from 
contesting that the income of G & A was taxable to him 
specifically under Subpart F of the Tax Code.  Anderson now 
challenges the adverse holdings. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of the 
Tax Court based on 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).
 4
  On March 7, 
2001, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the Tax 
Court entered an order determining the tax deficiency and 
fraud penalty for each year from 1995 through 1999, leaving 
no issues for it to decide and thus providing this Court with 
jurisdiction under that statute.  We review the Tax Court’s 
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear 
                                              
 
4
 Venue in this Court is appropriate because Anderson 
was a resident of New Jersey at the time he filed his petition 
for redetermination.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A). 
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error.  Capital Blue Cross v. Comm’r, 431 F.3d 117, 123-24 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
 
A. The Preclusive Effect of Anderson’s Criminal 
Conviction 
 
 Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “once an 
issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in 
subsequent suits based on a different cause of action 
involving a party to the prior litigation.”  Montana v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).  It applies, however, 
only if:  “(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as 
that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually 
litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid 
judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the 
prior judgment.”  In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citations omitted).  In light of these principles, we 
agree with the numerous courts that have held that, under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, a conviction for criminal tax 
evasion conclusively establishes the defendant’s civil liability 
for tax fraud for the same year.  See Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 
F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993); Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 
260, 262 (10th Cir. 1989); Gray v. Comm’r, 708 F.2d 243, 
246 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Moore, 360 F.2d 353, 
356 (4th Cir. 1966).  This is because the elements of evasion 
under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and fraud under 26 U.S.C. § 6663 are 
identical.  See, e.g., Gray, 708 F.2d at 246.   
 
 Anderson nevertheless argues that the Tax Court erred 
in holding that his tax evasion conviction collaterally 
estopped him from litigating the taxability to him in 1998 and 
1999 of the income of G & A in the civil tax fraud 
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proceedings.  Where, as here, a conviction is the result of a 
guilty plea, its preclusive effect extends to all issues that are 
necessarily admitted in the plea.  See De Cavalcante v. 
Comm’r, 620 F.2d 23, 27 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. 
$448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Wight, 839 F.2d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978).  We find that 
Anderson admitted in his plea that the income of G & A was 
taxable to him in 1998 and 1999, and that this admission was 
necessary to his conviction. 
 
 Anderson pleaded guilty to a charge that in 1998 “a 
substantial additional tax was due and owing to the United 
States” from him and that “[s]pecifically, he failed to report . . 
. $126,303,951 Subpart F investment-type income from G & 
A.”  He also pleaded guilty to another charge that alleged the 
same with respect to 1999, except that the amount of 
unreported G & A income was $238,561,316.  These charges 
essentially allege that Anderson underpaid his taxes in 1998 
and 1999 because he did not report the income of G & A, 
which is comprehensible only to the extent that such income 
was taxable to him in those years.  By pleading guilty to these 
charges, Anderson thus admitted that required premise. 
 
 This admission could be considered necessary, though, 
only if Anderson’s conviction “hinge[d] on it.”  Bobby v. 
Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 835 (2009).  To convict Anderson of tax 
evasion, the Government was required to prove the existence 
of a tax deficiency.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7201.  Were the income 
of G & A not taxable to him in 1998 and 1999, however, 
Anderson’s failure to report it on his tax return would not 
have given rise to a deficiency.  The Government thus could 
not have secured his conviction without establishing the 
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taxability of this income.  We therefore find that Anderson’s 
conviction did hinge on that issue.  Our conclusion is not 
affected by the fact that Anderson was also charged with 
failing to report income from other sources in 1998 and 1999 
– including an account he held at Barclays Bank, a company 
called Esprit Telecom, and various capital gains – the 
taxability of which could also have substantiated his 
conviction.  As we have previously held, all “independently 
sufficient alternative findings should be given preclusive 
effect,” Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 
458 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2006).  The taxability to Anderson 
of the income of G & A in 1998 and 1999 was independently 
sufficient to establish the existence of a tax deficiency in 
those years and was thus a fact that was necessary to his 
conviction.  His admission to it in his guilty plea accordingly 
precludes him from contesting that issue in his civil tax fraud 
case.
5
 
 
 Finally, that the income of G & A is taxable to 
Anderson specifically under Subpart F of the Tax Code is 
also settled for purposes of this case.  The Tax Court rejected 
the IRS’s argument that Anderson’s guilty plea estopped him 
from contesting this tax treatment of G & A’s income.  It 
reasoned that, although G & A’s income was described as 
                                              
 
5
Pursuant to this reasoning, we also find that Anderson 
was collaterally estopped from disputing that the income from 
his Barclays account was taxable to him in 1998 and 1999.  
Based on this additional finding and on our analysis relating 
to the income of G & A, we reject Anderson’s argument that 
the Tax Court erred in denying him summary judgment on the 
issues of the taxability of income from the Barclays account 
and from G & A in 1998 and 1999. 
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“Subpart F income” in the charges of the indictment to which 
Anderson pleaded guilty, this detail was not essential to his 
judgment of conviction and thus could not be given 
preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings.  Regardless of 
this holding, however, the parties’ subsequent stipulation of 
the nature and composition of G & A’s income, designating 
amounts for Deficiency and Penalty for 1998 and 1999, 
necessitate the determination that it is taxable to Anderson 
under Subpart F because the figures would not support 
Anderson’s alternate theory that the income was capital gains.  
This conclusion, along with the preclusive effect of 
Anderson’s conviction for tax evasion described above, 
effectively resolve his civil tax deficiency stemming from the 
income of  G & A. 
 
A. The Preclusive Effect of the IRS’s Concession of 
All Deficiency and Penalty Issues for 1995-1997 
 
Anderson argues that because the IRS conceded all tax 
deficiency and penalty issues for 1995, 1996, and 1997, the 
Tax Court was required to find in his favor on those issues for 
the 1998 and 1999 tax years as well.  He specifically 
advances this argument in relation to the income of G & A 
and the interest income of his account at Barclays Bank.  He 
relies on three separate legal doctrines to support this 
argument - collateral estoppel, law of the case, and judicial 
admission – but each is inapplicable.   
 
1. Collateral Estoppel 
 
Anderson claims that when the Tax Court issued its 
order denying the IRS’s motion to sever, in which it stated 
that it “takes notice of [the IRS’s] concession of all tax and 
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penalty issues for 1995, 1996, and 1997 and will reflect that 
concession in its eventual entry of decision in [the] case,” it 
decided those issues in his favor.  He further claims that all 
deficiency and penalty issues for 1995 through 1997, 
including those related to G & A and his Barclays account, 
are “identical in all respects” to those for 1998 and 1999.  On 
this basis, Anderson argues that, by virtue of collateral 
estoppel, it is conclusively established in his civil tax fraud 
proceeding that the income from G & A and from his 
Barclays account gave rise to no tax deficiency or fraud 
penalty in 1998 and 1999. 
 
As we have already noted, an issue is conclusively 
established in future litigation through the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel only when it is determined by a final 
judgment.  Graham, 973 F.2d at 1097.  This principle is 
firmly established and beyond question.  See, e.g., G. & C. 
Merriaman Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28 (1916) (“[I]t is 
familiar law that only a final judgment is res judicata . . .”); 
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“[I]f there is no judgment, there is no preclusion.”); Clausen 
Co. v. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 889 F.2d 459, 465-66 (3d Cir. 
1989) (finding collateral estoppel did not apply to an 
interlocutory disposition).  The Tax Court’s denial of the 
IRS’s motion to sever can therefore have no preclusive effect 
under that doctrine.  It does not constitute a final judgment on 
any issue, including on that of whether Anderson was liable 
for tax deficiencies or fraud penalties for any year in relation 
to income from G & A or from his account at Barclays.  
Instead, all the Tax Court did in that order was advise the 
parties that it was taking notice of the IRS’s desire not to 
litigate tax years 1995 through 1997 and state that it would 
factor that position into its eventual final judgment.  When 
12 
 
that final judgment was issued, it showed deficiencies and 
penalties for 1998 and 1999 that implicitly included amounts 
related to G & A and the Barclays account.  Anderson 
identifies no previous final judgment making a determination 
in conflict with this result, and his argument that the Tax 
Court should have held that it had been conclusively 
established via the doctrine of collateral estoppel that he was 
not liable for deficiencies or penalties in relation to these two 
items in 1998 and 1999 thus cannot be accepted. 
 
 2.  Law of the Case 
 
 Anderson makes a similar argument that the Tax 
Court’s denial of the IRS’s motion to sever forecloses 
litigation of the taxability to him of the income G & A in 
1998 and 1999 under the law of the case doctrine.  Under that 
doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that 
decision should continue to govern the same issues in 
subsequent stages of the same case.”  Arizona v. California, 
460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983).   Anderson asserts that the Tax 
Court’s statement that it was “taking notice” of the IRS’s 
desire not to litigate tax years 1995 through 1997 was actually 
a holding that he was not liable for tax deficiencies or 
penalties for those years, and that because the IRS had alleged 
that he should have recognized income from G & A on his tax 
return for those years, it is additionally a legal determination 
that such income was not taxable to him in any year – 
including 1998 and 1999.  We disagree.  The Tax Court’s 
statement that it took notice of the IRS’s desire to concede tax 
and penalty issues for 1995 through 1997 simply does not 
represent any sort of decision.  Even if it did constitute a 
decision as to those three years, there is no merit to 
Anderson’s argument that it necessarily implies that the Tax 
13 
 
Court determined as a matter of law that income from G & A 
is not taxable to him, as the “decision” could be supported by 
any number of rationales.  For example, a finding that 
Anderson was not liable for deficiencies or penalties for 1995 
through 1997 could just as easily rest on a lack of evidence of 
fraud in those years, which as discussed earlier, would bar the 
IRS’s claims on statute of limitations grounds.  Anderson’s 
argument asks the Court to read more into the Tax Court’s 
“tak[ing] notice” than is warranted or possible, and it must be 
rejected. 
 
  3.  Judicial Admission 
 
 Finally, Anderson argues that the statement in the 
IRS’s motion to sever conceding deficiency and penalty 
issues for 1995 through 1997 constitutes a judicial admission 
that prevents the IRS from arguing “that there is United States 
tax liability for [G & A]” or that interest income from his 
Barclays account was intentionally omitted from his tax 
return in 1998 or 1999.  Judicial admissions are “admissions 
in pleadings, stipulations [or the like] which do not have to be 
proven in the same litigation.”  Giannone v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
238 F.2d 544, 547 (3d Cir. 1956).  To be binding, judicial 
admissions “must be statements of fact that require 
evidentiary proof, not statements of legal theories.”  In re 
Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 377 (3d Cir. 
2007).  For this reason, even if this Court were to accept the 
dubious claim that the IRS conceded in its motion to sever 
that income from G & A was not taxable to Anderson, that 
concession would not be binding on it because it would be a 
statement of a legal proposition.  Additionally, to be binding, 
judicial admissions must be unequivocal.  Id.  The IRS’s 
motion to sever very clearly relates only to tax years 1995, 
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1996 and 1997, and thus cannot be deemed to unequivocally 
state that the income of G & A was not taxable to Anderson 
or that he did not intentionally omit the interest on his 
Barclays account from his tax return in subsequent years.  
The doctrine of judicial admissions therefore has no 
application here. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION  
 
 We hold that Anderson’s conviction for tax evasion in 
1998 and 1999 precludes him, by virtue of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, from contesting in subsequent civil fraud 
proceedings that the income of G & A was taxable to him in 
those years.  We additionally conclude that the IRS’s 
concession of all deficiency and penalty issues for the years 
1995, 1996, and 1997 has no preclusive effect on those issues 
for 1998 and 1999.  For these reasons, we will affirm the Tax 
Court’s judgment. 
